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Casenote

State v. Jackson and the Explosion of
Liability for Felony Murder

I.

INTRODUCTION

In The Discourses,' Niccold Machiavelli wrote, "The dangers involved
in conspiracies[] ... are considerable, and go on all the time, for in a
conspiracy dangers crop up alike in forming the plot, in carrying it out,
and as a result of its having been carried out."' Although by its context
this remark refers to conspiracies to commit regicide and the problems
these conspiracies pose to the conspirators,' this remark well describes
practical and legal problems that can result from conspiracies to commit
felonies. In Georgia this is particularly true following the June 28, 2010
ruling in State v. Jackson.' Jackson involved a conspiracy, the failure
of which caused one conspirator's death and exposed his fellow conspirators to liability for a crime greater than the conspiracy's intended aim.5
In what could lead to an explosion of criminal liability, the Georgia
1. NiccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES (Bernard Cricked ed., Leslie J. Walker
trans., Penguin Books 1970).
2. Id. at 401.
3. See id.
4. 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010).
5. See id. at 646-47, 697 S.E.2d at 757-58.
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Supreme Court held that whenever one felon dies as a proximate result
of the felony, the co-felons are liable for felony murder.' Abolishing the
decades-old rule from State v. Crane,' the court extended defendants'
felony-murder liability to killings committed by their prospective
victims.'
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The chain of events giving rise to State v. Jackson' started when
Jerold Daniels and the two co-defendants, Carlester Jackson and Warren
Smith, planned the armed robberyo of a supposed drug dealer named
Arthur Hogan.n At the time of the incident, Smith and Jackson waited
in the vicinity; 12 Smith stayed in an SUV, ready to fulfill his job as the
getaway driver, while Jackson stood by as Daniels's lookout." As
Daniels, armed with a handgun, moved in to carry out the robbery,
Hogan realized what was going on, and a gunfight ensued. At least one
bullet from Hogan's gun hit Daniels, killing him. Smith and Hogan left
immediately after the shooting, but Jackson was arrested at the site by
an off-duty police officer. Smith returned briefly to the scene but drove
away when he encountered the police. He escaped briefly to Rhode
Island before he was caught and extradited back to Georgia."
The prosecution obtained indictments against Jackson and Smith for
the felony murder of Daniels. Both Smith and Jackson were accused of
aggravated assault as an underlying felony to felony murder." Smith
faced an additional felony murder charge based on "possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon."1 6 The trial judge dismissed the felony
murder charges because the causal link between the defendants' actions
The State petitioned the
and the victim's death was indirect."
supreme court, which granted certiorari. 8

6. Id. at 653, 660, 697 S.E.2d at 762, 767.
7. 247 Ga. 779, 279 S.E.2d 695 (1981).
8. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647, 652, 660, 697 S.E.2d at 758, 762, 767.
9. 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010).
10. Id. at 646, 697 S.E.2d at 757-58.
11. Brief of Appellant at 3-4, State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) (No.
S1OA0070), 2009 WL 5244085 at *5.
12. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648, 697 S.E.2d at 758.
13. Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 4.
14. Id. at 4-5.
15. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648, 697 S.E.2d. at 758.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 648, 697 S.E.2d at 758-59.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
An understanding of aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and felony
murder in Georgia is necessary to appreciate the impact of the holding
in State v. Jackson" and its legal implications.
A.

Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy
Section 16-2-20 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 20
reads as follows:
(a) Every person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party
thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the
crime.
(b) A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he:
(1) Directly commits the crime;
(2) Intentionally causes some other person to commit the crime
under such circumstances that the other person is not guilty of any
crime either in fact or because of legal incapacity;
(3) Intentionallyaids or abets in the commission of the crime or
(4) Intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures
another to commit the crime.

Under subsection (b)(3) an aider or abettor who is not "personally
involved in" a crime is still vicariously liable for the crime.22 In Carter
v. State,23 the Georgia Court of Appeals articulated this rule.2 4 The
defendants, Carter and Waters, were charged with aggravated sodomy.
Carter coerced the victim into engaging in sodomy with Waters by
beating the victim." The court held that Carter aided and abetted the
sodomy. 26
The judiciary in Georgia has also determined that O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20
creates vicarious liability for conspirators." As announced in Bruce v.
State,28 participants in a conspiracy are vicariously liable for "inciden-

19. 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010).
20. O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 (2007).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177, 177, 308 S.E.2d 438, 439-40 (1983); see also
O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(bX3).
23. 168 Ga. App. 177, 308 S.E.2d 438 (1983).
24. Id. at 177, 308 S.E.2d at 439-40.
25. Id. at 177, 308 S.E.2d at 439.
26. Id. at 177, 308 S.E.2d at 439-40.
27. See, e.g., Grant v. State, 198 Ga. App. 357, 358, 401 S.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1991)
(quoting Scott v. State, 229 Ga. 541, 544, 192 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1972)).
28. 263 Ga. 273, 430 S.E.2d 745 (1993).
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tal and probable" measures taken by another participant to facilitate a
conspiratorial objective, whether or not such measures were agreed
upon.
In Bruce the Georgia Supreme Court applied this rule to a conspiracy
to commit burglary."0 Johnny Bruce, the defendant, made plans with
Jack Adams and Randall Pettyjohn to burglarize Donald Ivey's house.
In preparation, Bruce dropped off Adams and Pettyjohn close to Ivey's
house, equipping them with a gun and binoculars as well as pantyhose
to conceal their faces. The purpose was to reconnoiter before committing
the burglary. According to the plan, Adams and Pettyjohn were
supposed to call Bruce from a convenience store to pick them up
following their reconnoiter. Instead, Adams and Pettyjohn chose to
break in alone. Upon doing so, they were surprised by the presence of
Ivey's girlfriend. While the burglars were still there, Ivey came back
home. Receiving no reply after calling to his girlfriend, he walked into
the living room where the burglars were restraining his girlfriend at
knifepoint, and he exchanged gunfire with Adams. Adams was hit first
by two bullets; however, before dying Adams fatally wounded Ivey."
Bruce was found guilty of Ivey's murder. On appeal to the supreme
court, Bruce argued that the conspiracy he formed with Adams and
Pettyjohn was only to reconnoiter and was distinct from the conspiracy
Adams and Pettyjohn formed to carry out the burglary. 32 The court
rejected that argument, holding that knowledge of when a crime would
be attempted is unnecessary for a conspirator's vicarious liability.3
The court reasoned that Bruce had a "common design" with Adams and
Pettyjohn-to perpetrate a burglary-and the measures Adams and
Pettyjohn took "were expedient to the accomplishment of the common
design."3 4
The supreme court decision in Crosby v. State35 outlines the temporal
extent of conspirator liability.36 The court addressed conspirator
liability for the theft of an automobile." The court stated that conspirator liability extends to "such matters as concealing the crime or
The court held that the duration of a
suppressing evidence."3

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 274-75, 430 S.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 275, 430 S.E.2d at 747-48.
Id. at 273, 430 S.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 273-74, 430 S.E.2d at 746-47.
Id. at 275, 430 S.E.2d at 747-48.
Id.
232 Ga. 599, 207 S.E.2d 515 (1974).
Id. at 601, 207 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 600, 207 S.E.2d at 517.
Id. at 601, 207 S.E.2d at 518.
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conspirator's liability spans the time from the conspiracy's inception-even if predating the conspirator's entry-to its termination." The
court reasoned that because "[t]he crimes were so interrelated"-because
they involved the same stolen automobile-they were all part of the same
conspiracy.4 0
B.

Felony Murder Liability
According to the supreme court in Ford v. State," O.C.G.A. § 16-51(c) 42 simply reiterates the common law felony murder rule." The
O.C.G.A. states, "A person also commits the offense of murder when, in
the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another human being
irrespective of malice."" As stated in Ford, a felony serving as a
predicate for felony murder must "create a foreseeable risk of death." 5
This, the court said, is because the felony murder rule is aimed solely at
deterring dangerous felonies."
Using this line of reasoning in Ford, the court declined to uphold a
felony murder conviction based on possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon."7 In Ford the defendant accidentally shot someone to death
while trying to unload his semiautomatic pistol in a house that,
unbeknownst to him, stood above an apartment. The gun went off,
causing a bullet to drill through the floor and hit the victim below."
The court observed that in a different situation the same felony might
have met the requisite dangerousness to support felony murder.
Such was the situation in Hines v. State,50 in which the defendantfelon killed the victim in a hunting accident." The court distinguished
Ford,explaining that the defendant in Hines was aware that there were
people in the vicinity, had consumed alcohol prior to the incident, had
deliberately aimed and fired, and "took an unsafe shot at dusk, through

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 600-01, 207 S.E.2d at 517-18.
262 Ga. 602, 423 S.E.2d 255 (1992).
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) (2007 & Supp. 2010).
Ford, 262 Ga. at 603, 423 S.E.2d at 256.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c).
262 Ga. at 603, 423 S.E.2d at 256.
Id.
Id. at 602-03, 423 S.E.2d at 255-56.
Id. at 602, 423 S.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 603, 423 S.E.2d at 256.
276 Ga. 491, 578 S.E.2d 868 (2003).
Id. at 491, 493, 578 S.E.2d at 871-72.
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heavy foliage, at a target eighty feet away."" The court held that these
considerations made the underlying felony "inherently dangerous."
Evaluation of a felony's inherent dangerousness is based on the facts
of a case as opposed to abstraction." The decision in Mosley v. State5 5
illustrated this view eleven years ago when the supreme court held that
a child's possession of a knife at school was inherently dangerous."
The child-defendant, Lyndon Mosley, was convicted of felony murder
predicated on his possession of a weapon on school property." Mosley
stabbed Ronald Gaines to death during a schoolyard fight." The court
held the felony was sufficiently dangerous for felony murder." The
court reached this result by examining the events leading up to Gaines's
death and concluded, "Th[e] evidence shows that Mosley's possession of
the knife played a critical role in escalating a typical schoolyard fight
into a homicide."60 The court reasoned that the fight's onlookers
persuaded Gaines to either fight Mosley or withdraw from the altercation because Mosley was armed." The court, noting Gaines's bulkier
build, also suggested that initially the knife emboldened Mosley to
engage Gaines in the altercation.6 2
C.

Felony Murder and Mens Rea
To be convicted of felony murder, a defendant need not have had any
particular mental state with regard to the killing" but must have had
"criminal intent to commit the underlying felony."' Once a conspiracy

52. Id. at 493, 578 S.E.2d at 872. He thought he was aiming at a turkey. Id.
53. Id.
54. Mosley v. State, 272 Ga. 881, 883, 536 S.E.2d 150, 152 (2000).
55. 272 Ga. 881, 536 S.E.2d 150 (2000).
56. Id. at 881-82, 536 S.E.2d at 151.
57. Mosley violated O.C.GA. § 16-11-127.1(b) (amended 2010) (current version at
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b) (2007 & Supp. 2010)). In 2000 the statute stated as follows:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person to carry or to possess or have under such
person's control while within a school safety zone or at a school building, school
function, or school property or on a bus or other transportation furnished by the
school any weapon or explosive compound, other than fireworks .... Any person
who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a felony ....
Id.
58. Mosley, 272 Ga. at 881-82, 536 S.E.2d at 151.
59. Id. at 883, 536 S.E.2d at 152.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Tessmer v. State, 273 Ga. 220, 223, 539 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2000).
64. Id. at 222, 539 S.E.2d at 818 (quoting Martin v. State, 271 Ga. 301, 303, 518 S.E.2d
898, 901 (1999)).
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to rob is formed, any killing to pursue the conspiracy's objective makes
the conspirators liable, as a matter of law, for felony murder based on
the robbery.65 Whether a conspirator is ever aware of the killer's
weapon is immaterial.66 Aggravated assault can also be a predicate for
felony murder in Georgia. 67 As the supreme court reasoned in Durden
v. State," however, sufficient provocation of the aggravated assault
mitigates the felony murder to voluntary manslaughter." The court in
Durden held that a single aggravated assault cannot make a person
guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder.o
Felony Murder and Direct Causation
The 1981 case State v. Crane" was the origin of Georgia's rule that
its felony murder statute does not impose liability without direct
causation linking the actions of a felon or co-felon to a death.72 In
Crane Roy Combs was shot to death during his burglary of the shooter's
The State successfully petitioned the supreme court for
home."
certiorari after the trial court dismissed the felony murder charges
against Combs's three co-felons." To arrive at its holding, the court
found ambiguity in the statutory meaning of "he causes" and applied the
rule of lenity." The court made its decision in spite of its expressed
The opinion was unaniinclination to rule in favor of liability."
mous." No cases were cited in support of its brief decision, save one
articulating the rule of lenity." Decades later, the State in Jackson
would maintain that Crane rejected the proximate cause theory in favor
of an agency theory of felony murder."
At least three cases following Crane have created some confusion
about the supreme court's definition of causation; however, overall these

D.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Williams v. State, 276 Ga. 384, 385, 578 S.E.2d 858, 860 (2003).
Id. at 386, 578 S.E.2d at 861.
See, e.g., Huntley v. State, 271 Ga. 227, 230, 518 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1999).
271 Ga. 449, 519 S.E.2d 921 (1999).
Id. at 451, 519 S.E.2d at 923.
Id.
247 Ga. 779, 279 S.E.2d 695 (1981).
Id. at 779, 279 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 779 & n.1., 279 S.E.2d at 696 & n.1.
Id. at 779, 279 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 779, 279 S.E.2d at 697.
See id. at 779, 279 S.E.2d at 696.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 8-9.
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cases appear to relax the standard for directness.' First, in the 1982
decision of Durden v. State," William Durden burglarized a bait shop.
The owner, upon hearing the alarm go off in his residence behind the
store, entered his store and got into a gunfight with the defendant. No
bullet hit the owner, but he died from a heart attack created by the
stress of the incident. At the time of the incident, the owner was
overweight and had pre-existing cardiovascular disease.8 2 In addressing Durden's challenge to his felony murder conviction on causation
grounds, the supreme court modified a homicide standard for proximate
causation and applied the standard specifically to felony murder:
Where one commits a felony upon another, such felony is to be
accounted as the efficient, proximate cause of the death whenever it
shall be made to appear either that the felony directly and materially
contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause
of the death, or that the injury materially accelerated the death,
although proximately occasioned by a pre-existing cause.'
The court also decided proximate cause could exist without physical
In upholding the felony murder
injury to the homicide victim.8
conviction based on aggravated assault and burglary, the court expressly
distinguished Crane,reasoning that "[Durden's] actions were directed at
the deceased" whereas the actions in Crane were not." The court held
the defendant's actions could have proximately caused the victim's death
based on the proximate cause standard the court articulated.' There
was no explicit discussion of the court's application of this standard to
the facts."
A second case, McCoy v. State," decided in 1993, also caused
confusion about Crane. McCoy was an arsonist who set fire to a house.
The victim, a volunteer firefighter, arrived to combat the flames but
while doing so fell down a nearby well-whose cover had also caught
fire-and succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning." The supreme
court upheld McCoy's felony murder conviction, deciding that one could

80. See generally Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372, 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996); McCoy v. State,
262 Ga. 699, 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993); Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982).
81. 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982).
82. Id. at 325, 297 S.E.2d at 239.
83. Id. at 328, 297 S.E.2d at 241-42.
84. Id. at 328, 297 S.E.2d at 241.
85. Id. at 329, 297 S.E.2d at 242.
86. Id. at 329, 297 S.E.2d at 241-42.
87. See id.
88. 262 Ga. 699, 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993).
89. Id. at 699-700, 425 S.E.2d at 647.
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90
"directly attribut[e]" the firefighter's death to McCoy's actions. The
court reasoned that the incineration of the well cover, the victim's
presence, and the smoke the victim fatally inhaled were "direct result[s]"
of the arson." Thus, the opinion appears to raise the question of what
significance, if any, a victim's actions have regarding direct causation.
The ruling is further confusing when juxtaposed with the distinction the
court drew in Durden considering that McCoy did not direct his arson at
the firefighter."
Finally, the 1996 case Smith v. State" concerned defendants who
were shooting at each other when one of their bullets hit and killed a
bystander." The supreme court held that both defendants could be
liable for felony murder based on their aggravated assaults on one
another even though only one of the defendants actually shot the
victim." In support of this decision, the court reasoned that the
gunfight was a product of the defendants "acting in concert," and "the
death was directly caused by the gunfight."96
The case law establishes that conspirators are criminally liable for
"incidental and probable" illegal actions taken by each other to facilitate
Moreover, a
This includes murder."
conspiratorial objectives."
defendant can be guilty of felony murder if death results from the
felony.99 At the time Jackson reached the supreme court, the main
restriction was that the actions of a felon or co-felon must be a direct
cause of death.'00

IV. COURT's RATIONALE
Majority Opinion
In State v. Jackson,'o an opinion authored by Justice Nahmias, the
supreme court abolished the direct cause rule for felony murder, deciding

A.

90. Id. at 700, 425 S.E.2d at 647-48.
91. Id.
92. Compare Durden, 250 Ga. at 329, 297 S.E.2d at 241-42, with McCoy, 262 Ga. at
700, 425 S.E.2d at 647.
93. 267 Ga. 372, 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996).
94. Id. at 372, 477 S.E.2d at 830.
95. Id. at 372, 375, 477 S.E.2d at 830, 832.
96. Id. at 375-76, 477 S.E.2d at 832-33 (emphasis added).
97. Bruce, 263 Ga. at 274-75, 430 S.E.2d at 747.
98. See id. at 273, 430 S.E.2d at 746.
99. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c); Smith, 267 Ga. at 375,477 S.E.2d at 832; McCoy, 262 Ga.
at 700, 425 S.E.2d at 647-48; Durden, 250 Ga. at 329, 297 S.E.2d at 242.
100. Crane, 247 Ga. at 779, 279 S.E.2d at 696.
101. 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010).
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that as long as a felony is a proximate cause of death the causation
element for felony murder is satisfied.o 2 The court justified its break
with stare decisis by noting the disharmony of earlier case holdings on
According to the court, in both Durden v.
the direct cause rule.'
State'" and McCoy v. State,10 ' "the death[s] could hardly be said to
have been 'caused directly' by the defendant's acts.""0 ' With regard to
Smith v. State,' the court implied that the court had made an
awkward distinction between the facts of that case and those originally
giving rise to the direct cause rule.' The court criticized the characterization of two persons engaged in a gunfight as "acting in concert."109
The court maintained that legislative inaction was no indicator of
acquiescence in the case of the direct cause rule, reasoning that the
Georgia General Assembly (Assembly) would probably not be sensitive
enough to the ramifications of earlier rulings requiring direct cause for
felony murder to induce action on the Assembly's part."0 This, the
court said, is partly because felony murder has seldom been prosecuted
when the causation was only indirect."' The court also pointed out
"Crane's odd reasoning and the inconsistent application of its holding."' The court further considered that the Assembly might reasonably fear that changing the causation wording in the felony murder
statute alone would send the courts a message to infer a requirement of
direct causation in all other criminal statutes."13
The court analogized felony murder liability to vehicular homicide
liability."
The court observed that the same issue regarding proximate versus direct cause has arisen in vehicular homicide cases, and
indirect proximate cause has been held sufficient for conviction."'
Reasoning that the statutory wording of causation for vehicular homicide

102. Id. at 660, 697 S.E.2d at 767.
103. Id. at 654-58, 697 S.E.2d at 763-66.
104. 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982).
105. 262 Ga. 699, 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993).
106. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 656, 697 S.E.2d at 764.
107. 267 Ga. 372, 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996).
108. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 655-56, 697 S.E.2d at 764.
109. Id. at 656, 697 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Smith, 267 Ga. at 376, 477 S.E.2d at 833)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 659-60, 697 S.E.2d at 766-67.
111. Id. at 660, 697 S.E.2d at 767.
112. Id. at 659, 697 S.E.2d at 766.
113. Id. at 660, 697 S.E.2d at 767.
114. Id. at 656-58, 697 S.E.2d at 765-66.
115. Id. at 656-57, 697 S.E.2d at 764-65.
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is practically no different from that for felony murder, the court decided
that causation should be interpreted the same in both instances.1 16
Tracing the history of the direct cause rule, the court mentioned
Hyman v. State"' and Hill v. State"s and indicated Hyman as a case
that might have been decided the same way without the direct cause
rule.'1 9 The defendant in Hyman lied to police who were trying to
track down a murder suspect who, unbeknownst to the police was hiding
in the defendant's house. Hyman denied the suspect was there, but the
police searched the premises anyway. The suspect shot to death a police
officer upon the officer's search of a closet. Hyman was convicted of
felony murder predicated on making a false statement. 20 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that the lie was not the direct cause of
the officer's death.12 ' In Hill the defendant engaged police in a
gunfight, during which a bystander was shot and killed by a police
officer, who was shot and killed by the defendant. During the gunfight,
there were multiple people in the vicinity, including the defendant, the
two victims, and several children.' 2 2 Applying direct cause analysis,
the supreme court decided Hill's felony murder conviction for the death
23
of the bystander was insupportable.
B. Dissenting Opinions
First, Chief
There were two dissenting opinions in Jackson."
Justice Hunstein objected to the ruling pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-220"2s: the defendants' purported felony murder did not occur in any of
the four situations that permit a criminal conviction under the statute.12 6 Chief Justice Hunstein reasoned that, for the purposes of the
statutory wording of the first situation, Jackson and Smith "did not
directly commit the alleged crime." 2 7 She considered the second
situation inapplicable because the supposed drug dealer's deadly actions
were not "intentionally cause[d]" by the defendants.128 She character-

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 657-58, 697 S.E.2d at 765-66.
272 Ga. 492, 531 S.E.2d 708 (2000).
250 Ga. 277, 295 S.E.2d 518 (1982).
Jackson, 287 Ga. at 654-55, 697 S.E.2d at 763-64.
Hyman, 272 Ga. at 492, 531 S.E.2d at 709-10.
Id. at 493, 531 S.E.2d at 710.
Hill, 250 Ga. at 278-79, 295 S.E.2d at 520-21.
Id. at 279-80, 295 S.E.2d at 521
See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 661, 663, 697 S.E.2d at 767, 769.
O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 (2007).
Jackson, 287 Ga. at 662, 697 S.E.2d at 768 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ized the majority decision as "blatant judicial activism" and an
assumption of the Assembly's lawmaking power.12
In the second dissent, Justice Thompson focused on stare decisis."o
Justice Thompson considered whether there had been "legislative
acquiescence" to the direct cause rule.3 1 In support of stare decisis,
he cited the need to maintain "predictability, stability, and continuity"
and the court's duty to act consistently with legislative intent as
indicated by the Assembly's acquiescence.132
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The ramifications of State v. Jackson 33 extend beyond a felon's
liability for the death of a co-conspirator. To reach its result the
supreme court stripped away a critical sub-element of causation in felony
murder.34 The significance of the direct cause rule can be discerned
by evaluating Hyman v. State 's and Hill v. State1'3 using only proximate cause analysis.
As the court expressed in Jackson, "the issue of proximate causation
is so fact-intensive. That is why proximate cause determinations are
generally left to the jury at trial."m In Hyman the State asserted in
its brief to the supreme court that the defendant's false statement about
the suspect hiding in his house foreseeably endangered the police
officer's life. To support this, the State argued there was evidence that
the defendant was aware of the suspect's violent propensities and armed
status and that he had warned the suspect that police had arrived.' 8
The State continued, "Additionally, [police] provided that had the
appellant's false statement not been given, the officers would not have
searched the residence but would have forced [the suspect] outside by
other means.""' The court never reached the issue of foreseeability in
0
Hyman."1
Yet, so long as Durden v. State14 1 remains good law,

129. Id. at 663, 697 S.E.2d at 769.
130. See id. at 663-65, 697 S.E.2d at 769-70 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 664, 697 S.E.2d at 769.
132. Id. at 665, 697 S.E.2d at 770.
133. 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010).
134. See id. at 647, 697 S.E.2d at 758.
135. 272 Ga. 492, 531 S.E.2d 708 (2000).
136. 250 Ga. 277, 295 S.E.2d 518 (1982).
137. 287 Ga. at 652, 697 S.E.2d at 762.
138. Brief of Appellee at 9-11, Hyman, 272 Ga. 492, 531 S.E.2d 708 (No. S00A0844),
2000 WL 34252047 at *9-11.
139. Id. at 11.
140. Hyman, 272 Ga. at 493, 531 S.E.2d at 710.
141. 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982).
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there was proximate cause in Hyman if the shooting was an "accruing
immediate cause of the death" and making the false statement "directly
and materially contributed to the happening of' the shooting, though
this assumes that by lying Hyman "commit[ted] a felony upon" the
victim. 14 2 In light of Jackson, should the supreme court consider such
arguments for proximate cause persuasive a conviction of felony murder
would stand.14 3
A compelling argument exists for finding proximate cause in Hill by
analogizing it to Smith v. State,'" a vehicular homicide case decided
in 2009. In Smith the defendant was in a pickup truck, speeding to
avoid apprehension by police. A police car chasing the defendant plowed
into another car at an intersection; the police officer's view was
obstructed by the defendant's truck as the truck and police car ran a red
light. The victim inside the other car was killed. As a result, the
The
defendant was convicted of first degree homicide by vehicle."
supreme court held the evidence sufficient for conviction,'s thereby
implicitly holding that the defendant's actions could have proximately
caused the victim's death."' Thus, in Hill and Smith the deadly acts
of a third party were incited by the defendant's illegal conduct and
misdirected at the victim. 148
The New York case People v. Hernandez149 offers further persuasive
support for proximate causation in the fact pattern in Hill. In Hernandez the New York Court of Appeals held that drawing gunfire from
police could proximately cause an officer's death by friendly fire.'
The court stated, "[It is simply implausible for defendants to claim that
defendants could not have foreseen a bullet going astray when Hernandez provoked a gun battle outside a residential building in an urban
area." 1 ' If the Georgia Supreme Court similarly held this, the holding

142. Id. at 329, 297 S.E.2d at 241.
143. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647,697 S.E.2d at 758 (holding proximate cause sufficient
for felony murder).
144. 285 Ga. 725, 681 S.E.2d 161 (2009).
145. Id. at 725-26, 681 S.E.2d at 162.
146. Id. at 726, 681 S.E.2d at 162.
147. See id. at 728-29, 681 S.E.2d at 163-64 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting) (explaining
that a "trier of fact could find that [the defendant] was the proximate cause of the victim's
death" but ultimately concluding that the evidence on the issue of proximate causation was
insufficient as "the officer could reasonably be found to be the proximate cause of the
collision").
148. CompareSmith, 285 Ga. at 725-26,681 S.E.2d at 162 (majority opinion), with Hill,
250 Ga. at 278-79, 295 S.E.2d at 520.
149. 624 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1993).
150. Id. at 662, 666.
151. Id. at 666.
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would suggest that, under certain circumstances, accidental killings by
third parties attempting to thwart a defendant in the commission of a
52
crime could result in felony murder liability for the defendant.H
Suppose a defendant tried to elude police but did not fire at them.
Instead, a bullet fired by one officer accidentally hit an innocent third
party. Would there be proximate cause then? A 1974 case from Illinois,
People v. Hickman,'3 may be instructive. In Hickman the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed "whether the fleeing perpetrators of a forcible
felony are guilty of murder when a pursuing police officer is mistakenly
shot and killed by a fellow officer also in pursuit of the fleeing felons."' 54 The police were trying to catch Glenn Hickman and Anthony
Rock who had just burglarized a liquor warehouse. Chasing Hickman
and Rock as they ran away from the warehouse, one police officer,
Sergeant Cronk, came across "a crouched figure carrying a handgun"
5
who was, in fact, his fellow police officer, Detective Loscheider."'
Thinking Loscheider to be one of the suspects he was after, Cronk shot
at him after issuing a warning. Loscheider died, and Hickman and Rock
were prosecuted for felony murder."'
The jury returned a guilty verdict, but "the trial court entered an
order arresting the judgment.""' The supreme court affirmed the
intermediate appellate court's reversal of the trial court's decision,
reasoning in part that the defendants caused the chase by running away
after burglarizing the warehouse.' The supreme court reasoned that
this made Cronk's fatal action "a direct and foreseeable consequence of
[the] defendants' actions" because Cronk discharged his firearm to stop
the defendants.' 9
Had the same facts in Hickman taken place in Georgia before Jackson,
Hickman and Rock would not have been liable for felony murder. The
actions of Cronk, not those of Hickman or Rock, would have been the
direct cause of Loscheider's death.o After Jackson a felony murder

152. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647,697 S.E.2d at 758 (holding proximate cause sufficient
for felony murder).
153. 319 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1974).
154. Id. at 511.
155. Id. at 511-12.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 511.
158. Id. at 513-14
159. Id. at 513.
160. See Hill, 250 Ga. at 279-80, 295 S.E.2d at 521 (holding a defendant who instigated
a gunfight with police not liable for felony murder as a result of the killing of an innocent
bystander by a police officer).
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conviction would be supportable, provided that a jury could find the
burglary proximately caused Loscheider's death.'
The opinion in Mosley v. State6 2 sheds more light on the potential
reach of the Jackson ruling. Consider this change to the facts: a child
brings a weapon to school but does not use it. Rather, a second child
sees the first child carrying the weapon in full view during a fight the
second child has with another student. The second child snatches the
weapon and kills the student he is fighting. Under State v. Crane,'
there would be no felony murder liability for the first child because that
child's actions did not directly cause the victim's death.164 Now, under
Jackson the causation element is satisfied if the possession of the
weapon by the first child proximately caused the victim's death.'
Examining such hypothetical situations, it appears there is ample
room for felony murder liability to expand following Jackson. Of course,
Georgia courts might decide to control the explosion by creating
exceptions to Jackson. After all, three supreme court justices-Chief
Justice Hunstein, Justice Thompson, and Justice Benham-dissented in
Jackson.166
On the other hand, Georgia conspiracy law stands to widen the
explosion's radius. Under Bruce v. Statel67 and Crosby v. State, 6 1 if
a defendant joined a conspiracy with another person the defendant could
be vicariously liable for certain "incidental and probable" felonies
committed by co-conspirators 69 regardless of what time during the
conspiracy they were committed. 7 0 Under Jackson the defendant
would also be liable for felony murder if any of those felonies proximately caused a death. 7 1
In light of these implications, it appears that conspirators have much
to worry about just as Machiavelli opined. 72 Not only is their own

161. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647,697 S.E.2d at 758 (holding proximate cause sufficient
for felony murder).
162. 272 Ga. 881, 536 S.E.2d 150 (2000).
163. 247 Ga. 779, 279 S.E.2d 695 (1981).
164. See id. at 779, 279 S.E.2d at 696 (holding there is no felony murder liability
without direct causation linking the actions of a felon or co-felon to a death).
165. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647,697 S.E.2d at 758 (holding proximate cause sufficient
for felony murder).
166. Id. at 660, 697 S.E.2d at 767.
167. 263 Ga. 273, 430 S.E.2d 745 (1993).
168. 232 Ga. 599, 207 S.E.2d 515 (1974).
169. Bruce, 263 Ga. at 274-75, 430 S.E.2d at 747.
170. Crosby, 232 Ga. at 601, 207 S.E.2d at 518.
171. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647, 697 S.E.2d at 758 (holding proximate cause sufficient
for felony murder).
172. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 1, at 401.
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physical safety threatened by others seeking to thwart their plans, but
there is also greater potential criminal liability for deaths none of them
may ever have intended. The boundaries of this new liability remain to
be defined. Depending on the supreme court's future rulings on
proximate causation, accidents committed by third parties may result in
serious criminal liability. Defense attorneys should prepare ways to
attack proximate causation given the particular facts of their cases, as
that now appears to be the key to saving clients who face felony murder
charges. Prosecutors should be conscious of the powerful weapon that
has been placed in their hands and decide what restraint, if any, should
be exercised for justice.
BRIAN E. BRUPBACHER
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